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ADMISSIBILITY OF LABORATORY REPORTS 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
The admissibility of laboratory reports at a crimi-
nal trial raises a number of evidentiary issues. First, 
the report must be authenticated. See Fed. R. Evid. 
901(a); State v. Kraft, 134 N.J. Super. 416, 341 A.2d 
373 (1975) (laboratory report not authenticated). 
Since, however, most reports in criminal cases are 
prepared by government laboratories, they often 
qualify as self-authenticating documents, and thus 
may be admitted without extrinsic evidence. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 902. Second, under the original writing 
("best evidence") rule, the admission of a written re-
port requires that the original be accounted for or 
produced. See Fed. R. Evid 1002. An exception, how-
ever, is typically recognized for public records. Under 
this exception certified copies of public records are 
admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 1005. 
The most serious obstacle to the admission of lab-
oratory reports is the hearsay rule, an issue which 
typically involves the applicability of the public rec-
ords, business records, and recorded recollection ex-
ceptions. In addition, the admission of laboratory re-
ports raises confrontation issues. This article ex-
amines these issues. 
FEDERAL TRIALS 
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the federal courts generally admitted labora-
tory reports under the business or public records ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule. E.g., U.S. v. Frattini, 501 
F.2d 1234, 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974) (lab report identifying 
substance as cocaine); U.S. v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 
520 (8th Cir. 1973) (lab report identifying substance as 
heroin), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); Government 
of the Virgin Islands v. St. Ange, 458 F.2d 981, 982 (3d 
Cir. 1972) (hospital lab report identifying sperm on 
vaginal smear); Kay v. U.S., 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir.) 
(lab report of blood-alcohol test), cert. denied, 358 
U.S. 825 (1958); U.S. v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 699 (7th 
Cir. 1957) (lab report identifying substance as heroin). 
See generally lmwinkelried, The Constitutionality of 
Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against 
Criminal Defendants, 30 Hastings L.J. 621 (1979). The 
enactm.ent of the Federal Rules, however, has cast 
doubt on the admissibility of laboratory reports 
under these exceptions. 
Public Records Exception 
Federal Rule 803(8) recognizes a hearsay excep-
tion for public records. It provides for the admissi-
bility of: 
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in 
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) 
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters ob-
served pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which 
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, 
in criminal cases matters observed by police officers 
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil ac-
tions and proceedings and against the Government in 
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an inves-
tigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, un-
less the sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
Laboratory reports fall within subsection (C) of the 
rule. In U.S. v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), the 
Second Circuit wrote, "It seems indisputable to us 
that the chemist's official report and worksheet ... 
can be characterized as reports of 'factual findings 
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law.'" /d. at 67. As the rule ex-
plicitly provides, investigative reports are not admis-
sible in criminal cases when offered against the ac-
cused; they are, however, admissible if offered 
against the prosecution. But see State v. Manke, 328 
N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1982) (chemist's report admitted 
under N.D. Rule 803(8)(C)). See generally Annat., 47 
A.L.R. Fed. 321 (1980) (collecting cases decided 
under Rule 803(8)(C)). 
The court in Oates also concluded that laboratory 
reports came within subsection (B) of the rule, a con-
clusion which raises two issues. The first issue in-
volved the meaning of the term "law enforcement 
personnel.'' The court held that chemists employed 
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by the U.S. Customs Service were "law enforcement 
personnel" within the meaning of the rule. According 
to the court, "any officer or employee of a govern-
mental agency which has law enforcement responsi-
bilities" qualifies as law enforcement personnel. 560 
F.2d at 68 ("Chemists at the laboratory are, without 
question, important participants in the prosecutorial 
effort."). See also U.S. v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793, 
(9th Cir. 1979) (customs inspector at border qualifies 
as "law enforcement personnel" under Rule 803(8)(B)), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049 (1978); U.S. v. Ruffin, 575 
F.2d 346, 356 (2d Cir. 1978) (IRS personnel who gather 
data and information routinely used in criminal pros-
ecutions perform a law enforcement function). 
The secqnd issue concerns the scope of the police 
records exclusion in Rule 803(8)(B). See generally An-
not., 37 A.L.R. Fed. 831 (1978) (collecting cases de-
cided under Rule 803(8)(B)'s police records 
exclusion). According to the Senate Report, this ex-
clusion was based on the belief that "observations 
by police officers at the scene of the crime or the ap-
prehension of the defendant are not as reliable as 
observations by public officials in other cases be-
cause of the adversarial nature of the confrontation 
between the police and the defendant in criminal 
cases." S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Gong., 2d Sess. 17, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. Code Gong. and Ad. News 7051, 
7064. In addition, the legislative history indicates 
that Congress was concerned with the confrontation 
problems raised by the use of police records in crimi-
nal trials. See U.S. v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 78 (2d Cir. 
1977) ("[T)he pervasive fear of the draftsmen and of 
Congress that interference with an accused's right to 
confrontation would occur was the reason why in 
criminal cases evaluative reports of government 
agencies and law enforcement reports were express-
ly denied the benefit to which they might otherwise 
be entitled under FRE 803(8)."). 
In Oates, the court adopted a literal interpretation 
of the police records exclusion, under which all po-
lice reports are automatically excluded. Other courts, 
however, have held that the police records exclusion 
applies only to observations made during "adver-
sarial confrontations." For example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has held that "Congress did not intend to ex-
clude [police] records of routine, nonadversarial mat-
ters .... " U.S. v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 
1979) (customs officer's recording of license plate 
numbers admissible), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049 
(1978). See a/so U.S. v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908,910-12 
(D,C. Cir. 1980) (chain of custody documents admissi-
ble); U.S. v. Hernandez-Rajas, 617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th 
Cir.) (Rule 803(8)(B) police records exclusion inap-
plicable to warrant of deportation), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 864 (1980); U.S. v. Union Nacional de Traba-
jadores, 576 F.2d 388, 391 (1st Cir. 1978) (marshall's 
return on service of injunction admissible); U.S. v. 
Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976) (routine recor-
ding of serial numbers unrelated to commission of 
crime admissible). 
In Orozco, the court focused on the Senate Report's 
language concerning the "adversarial nature of the 
confrontation" between the police and the defendant 
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"'at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of 
the defendant.'" 590 F.2d at 793, quoting S. Rep. No 
1277, 93d Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S·. Coc 
Con g. & Ad. News 7051, 7064. Under this view, it 
could be argued that laboratory analyses are far 
enough removed from such confrontations that the} 
are not adversarial encounters and thus not inadmi~ 
sible under the police records exclusion. 
The police records exclusion raises one addition<: 
issue. On its face, Rule 803(8)(B) would appear to ex· 
elude all police records, whether offered by the pros 
ecution or the defense. In this respect, subsection (I 
differs from subsection (C) which excludes evalua-
tive reports in criminal cases only when offered by 
the prosecution. In U.S. v. Smith, 521F.2d 957 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975), the D.C. Circuit addressed this issue: 
"[T)he apparently absolute language of 803(8)(B) had 
its origin in congressional concern that use of re-
ports against defendants would be unfair.'' /d. at 96E 
n.24. Accordingly, "803(8)(B) should be read, in ac-
cordance with the obvious intent of Congress and in 
harmony with 803(8)(C), to authorize the admission o 
the reports of police officers and other law enforce-
ment personnel at the request of the defendant in a 
criminal case." /d. Ohio Rule 803(8)(B) expressly per-
mits the introduction of police records when offered 
by the defendant. 
Relationship Between Public Records and 
Other Exceptions 
Another area of uncertainty concerns the relation· 
ship between the public records exception and othe 
hearsay exceptions. See generally 4 D. Louise II & C. 
Mueller, Federal Evidence§§ 452 & 456 (1980); 4 J. 
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence , 803 
(6)[07] (1981); Annat., 56 A.L.R. Fed. 168 (1982). 
Several courts have held that documents subject 
to exclusion under the public records exception are 
not admissible under any other hearsay exception. 
This interpretation may preclude the admissibility of 
laboratory reports as -business records, Rule 803(6), 
or as recorded recollection, Rule 803(5). In U.S. v. 
Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), the prosecution ar-
gued that a laboratory report identifying a substance 
as heroin was admissible under the business record: 
exception. Although the court recognized that as a 
general rule hearsay evidence failing to meet there-
quirements of one exception may nonetheless satis-
fy the standards of another exception, id. at 66, it 
found that the "clear legislative intent" of excluding 
police and investigative reports under Rule 803(8) 
precluded the admissibility of such reports under 
any other exception. /d. at 68, 72 & 77. Accord U.S. v. 
Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980) (FBI report); 
U.S. v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1980) (prison 
escape report); U.S. v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 355-56 (2d 
Cir. 1978) (IRS computer printouts); U.S. v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(government internal memoranda and letters). 
Other courts have disagreed with Oates, holding 
that Congress, by excluding police and investigative 
reports under Rule 803(8), intended to exclude such 
reports only when admitted in lieu of the testimony 
of the declarant. According to these courts, "[t]he ac· 
companying testimony of the author minimizes the 
danger of unreliability by giving the trier of fB:ct the 
opportunity to weigh his credibility and cons1der the 
circumstances surrounding preparation of the 
report." U.S. v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(Social Security forms admitted as business records 
where the preparers testified). Accord U.S. v. Sawyer, 
607 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979) (recorded recollec-
tions of IRS agent who testified at trial admissible 
under recorded recollection exception notwithstand-
ing their inadmissibility under Rule 803(8)(B)), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980). See also Abdel v. U.S., 
670 F.2d 73, 75n. 3 (7th Cir. 1982). 
Under this view, if a laboratory report qualifies as 
recorded recollection or as a business record and the 
declarant also testifies, the report is admissible. 
Thus, in U.S. v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 915 (D.C. Cir. 
1980), the D.C. Circuit upheld the admission of DEA 
analysis forms where the examining chemist testi-
fied but reversed as to those counts where a super-visi~g chemist testified in lieu of the examining 
chemist. 
Business Records Exception 
If not precluded by the police records exclusion of 
Rule 803(8), laboratory reports may be admissible as 
business records under Rule 803(6). Fed. R. Evid. 
803(6) provides for the admissibility of: 
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in 
any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diag· 
noses, made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if 
it was the regular practice of that business activity to 
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compila-
tion, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
other qualified witness, unless the source of information 
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate 
lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in 
this paragraph includes business, institution, associa· 
tion, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, 
whether or not conducted for profit. 
The rule expressly provides that "opinions" are ad-
missible under this exception. In contrast, Ohio Rule 
803(6) does not contain the term "opinions." 
The principal issue involves the trustworthiness 
clause of the rule, under which business records are 
excludable if "the source of information or the 
method or circumstances of preparation indicate 
lack of trustworthiness." One factor affecting relia-
bility is the motive of the person who prepares the 
record-whether the record was "prepared with an 
eye toward litigation." U.S. v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 
966 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The "litigation records" rule is 
derived from Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
In U.S. v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957), the 
Seventh Circuit wrote: 
[E]ven if memoranda ... are regularly prepared by law en· 
forcement officers, they lack the necessary earmarks of 
reliability and trustworthiness. Their source and the 
nature and manner of their compilation unavoidably dic-
tate that they are inadmissible under [the Federal Busi· 
ness Records Act]. They are also subject to objection 
that such utility as they possess relates primarily to 
prosecution of suspected law breakers, and only inci· 
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dentally to the systematic conduct of the police busi-
ness. /d. at 700. 
Accord U.S. v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 966-67 (D.C. Cir. 
1975); U.S. v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 
1971); Sanchez v. U.S., 293 F.2d 260, 269 (8th Cir. 
1961). 
The courts applying the litigation records rule, 
however, generally have not extended it to laboratory 
reports. See U.S. v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234, 1235 (2d 
Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 
1957)·/n re Nelson, 83 Misc. 2d 1081, 1083-84,374 
N.Y.s'.2d 982, 984-86 (Fam. Ct. 1975). For example, in 
U.S. v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 45 C.M.R. 353 (1972), the 
court stated: "We are not persuaded that a chemical 
examiner's report is made principally for the purpose 
of prosecution." /d. at 582, 45 C.M.R. at 356. In con-
trast, in State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn. 
1977), the court stated that laboratory reports "realis-
tically cannot be said to have been prepared for any 
reason other than their potential litigation value." /d. 
at 120. See also U.S. v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 967 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975) (police reports not admissible if offered by 
the prosecution). 
Recorded Recollection Exception 
If not inadmissible due to the police records ex-
clusion of Rule 803(8), laboratory reports may be ad-
missible as recorded recollection under Rule 803(5). 
For example, in U.S. v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279 (9th 
Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit upheld the admissibility 
of a chemist's report identifying a substance as co-
caine where the chemist testified that he had ana-
lyzed the substance and prepared the report but had 
no independent recollection of the tests. The chem-
ist did testify, however, that the report was accurate 
and was prepared contemporaneously with the tests. 
STATE TRIALS 
A minority of jurisdictions have excluded labora-
tory reports as a matter of evidence law. E.g, People 
v. Domin, 71 Mich. App. 315,248 N.W.2d 250 (1976) 
(lab report identifying substance as LSD is inadmis-
sible hearsay); State v. Russell, 114 N.H. 222, 317 
A.2d 781 (1974) (lab report identifying substance as 
marihuana does not qualify as a business record); 
Bennett v. State, 448 P.2d 253 (Okla. Grim. 1968) (psy-
chiatric report inadmissible). In addition, several 
courts have excluded laboratory reports on constitu-
tional grounds. See infra. 
Most state courts that have considered the admis-
sibility of laboratory reports have ruled that they are 
admissible. Some have used the business records 
exception. E.g., Henson v. State, 332 A.2d 773, 775 
(Del. 1975) (hospital record of rape victim examin-
ation); State v. Rhone, 555 S.W.2d 839, 841-42 (Mo. 
1977) (lab report of clothing and debris); State v. 
Taylor, 486 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. 1972) (lab report of 
debris); People v. Porter, 46 A.D. 2d 307, 311, 362 
N.Y.S.2d 249, 255 (1974) (lab report of blood-alcohol 
test); Burleson v. State, 585 S.W.2d 711, 712-13 (Tex. 
Grim. 1979) (autopsy report); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 
2d 112, 120-21, 542 P.2d 782, 787 (1975) (lab report of 
blood examination); State v. Ecklund, 30 Wash. App. 
313, 319, 633 P.2d 933, 936-37 (1981) (lab report of 
serological examination). 
Other courts have relied on the public records ex-
ception in upholding the admissibility of laboratory 
reports. E.g., Seals v. State, 282 Ala. 586, 604, 213 
So.2d 645, 662-63 (1968) (toxicologist report); State v. 
Snider, 168 Mont. 220, 229,541 P.2d 1204, 1209 (1975) 
(lab report identifying subtance as marihuana); In re 
KevinG., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 519,363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1002 
(Fam. Ct. 1975) (lab report identifying substance as 
heroin). In addition, some jurisdictions have enacted 
statutes providing for the admissibility of certain 
types of reports, such as breathalyzer results. See 
Wester v. State, 528 P.2d 1179, 1189 (197 4) (Alaska 
1974); State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 394, 297 A.2d 
223, 224 (1972). Most of these cases, however, pre-
date the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and their adoption by the states. The admissibility of 
laboratory reports in jurisdictions that have adopted 
the Federal Rules raises the same issues discussed 
above. The Military Rules, however, explicitly provide 
for the admissibility of "forensic laboratory reports" 
as business and public records. Mil. R. Evid. 803(6) 
and (8). 
A number of jurisdictions have enacted statutes 
that provide for the admissibility of laboratory re-
ports if the defendant does not request the presence 
of the examiner prior to trial. E.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 
691.2 (West 1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 
1112(1) (1983). Some states, in addition to requiring a 
defense request for the presence of the analyst at 
trial, require the prosecution to notify the defense of 
its intention to use the laboratory report at trial. Md. 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann.§ 10-306 (1980) (intoxica-
tion tests); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 2925.51(C) (Bald-
win 1982) (controlled substances). See State v. 
Reese, 56 Ohio App. 2d 278, 382 N.E.2d 1193 (1978) 
(failure to serve copy of lab report on defendant ren-
ders report inadmissible). A defendant's failure tore-
quest the presence of the examiner has been held to 
constitute a waiver of the right to confrontation. 
State v. Davison, 245 N.W.2d 321 (Iowa 1976), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); State v. Kramer, 231 N.W.2d 
874 (Iowa 1975). See also State v. Christianson, 404 
A.2d 999 (Me. 1979) (confrontation issue not raised). 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Even if laboratory reports are admissible under a 
hearsay exception, the Confrontation Clause might 
require exclusion. The Sixth Amendment provides 
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witness-
es against him." This clause was held binding upon 
the States. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). For 
discussions of the relationship between the hearsay 
rule and the Confrontation Clause, see 4 D. Louisell 
& C. Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 418 (1980); 4 J. Wein-
stein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence§ 800[04] 
(1981); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1185 (1979); Westen, Confrontation and Com-
pulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for 
Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567 (1978). 
A hearsay declarant is, in effect, a "witness 
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against" the accused. Thus, a literal interpretation of 
the Confrontation Clause would preclude the prose-
cution from introducing any hearsay statement, not-
withstanding the applicability of a recognized hear-
say exception. However, the SuprE;!me Court has re-
jected this interpretation. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 63 (1980) ("[l]f thus applied, the Clause would 
abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result 
long rejected as unintended and too extreme."). 
The Colifrontation Clause also could be interpret-
ed as requiring only the right to cross-examine in-
court witnesses and not out-of-court declarants. See 
5 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1397 (Chadbourn Rev. 
1974). Under this view, all recognized hearsay excep-
tions would satisfy constitutional requirements. The 
Supreme Court has also rejected this view: 
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and 
the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to pro-
tect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest 
that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation 
Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the 
rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed 
historically at common law. Our decisions have never es-
tablished such a congruence; indeed, we have more than 
once found a violation of confrontation values even 
though the statements in issue were admitted under an 
arguably recognized hearsay exception .... The con-
verse is equally true: merely because evidence is admit-
ted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does 
not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation 
rights have been denied. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 155-56 (1970). 
See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("It 
seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Con-
frontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule 
stem from the same roots. But this Court has never 
equated the two, and we decline to do so now."). 
The courts have disagreed over whether the admis-
sion of laboratory reports violates the Confrontation 
Clause. A number of courts have rejected the consti-
tutional argument. E.g., Kay v. U.S., 255 F.2d 476, 
480-81 (4th Cir.) (blood-alcohol report), cert. denied, 
358 U.S. 825 (1958); U.S. ex ref. Lurry v. Johnson, 378 
F. Supp. 818,822 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (hospital record of 
rape victim examination); Robertson v. Cox, 320 F. 
Supp. 900 (W.O. Va. 1970) (lab report identifying semi-
nal fluid); Henson v. State, 332 A.2d 773, 775 (Del. 
1975) (hospital record of rape victim examination); 
Groverv. State, 41 Md. App. 705,710-11.398 A.2d 528, 
531 (1979) (autopsy report); Commonwealth v. Franks, 
359 Mass. 577,580-81,270 N.E.2d 837,839-40 (1971) 
(hospital report identifying sperm); Commonwealth v. 
Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 461-62, 253 N.E.2d 346, 
351-52 (1969) (lab report identifying substance as 
marihuana); State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 396-97, 
297 A.2d 223, 226 (1972) (breathalyzer results); Burle-
son v. State, 585 S.W.2d 711,712-13 (Tex. Grim. 1979) 
(autopsy report); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 211 
Va. 62, 65, 175 S.E.2d 260, 262-63 (1970) (lab report 
identifying seminal fluid); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 
112, 116-19, 542 P.2d 782, 785-86 (1975) (laboratory re-
port of blood test). 
Other courts have found a confrontation violation 
where laboratory reports have been admitted in evi-
dence. See Steward v. Cowan, 528 F.2d 79, 85 (6th 
Cir. 1976) (ballistics report); Kienlen v. U.S., 437 F.2d 
843, 848-49 (10th Cir. 1971) (psychiatric report); Ph-il-
lips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1971) (psychi-
atric report); cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972); People 
v. Johnson, 11 Ill. App. 3d 395, 401-02, 296 N.E.2d 763, 
768 (1973) (psychiatric report); Gregory v. State, 40 
Md. App. 297, 325, 391 A.2d 437, 454 (1978) (psychi-
atric report); State v. Russell, 114 N.H. 223, 224-25, 
317 A.2d 781, 782 (1974) (lab report identifying sub-
stance as marihuana); Commonwealth v. McCloud, 
457 Pa. 310, 315-17, 322 A.2d 653,657 (1974) (autopsy 
report); State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117, 122 
(Tenn. 1977) (lab report identifying substances as 
LSD and marihuana). 
These cases, however, were decided prior to the 
Supreme Court's latest confrontation decision. In 
Roberts v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Court set forth 
a two-step analysis for applying the Confrontation 
Clause. First, the Confrontation Clause "normally re-
quires a showing that [the declarant] is unavailable." 
/d. at 66. Second, even if the declarant is unavailable, 
the hearsay statement must bear "adequate indicia 
of reliability." /d. 
Indicia of Reliability 
Several passages in Roberts indicate that state-
ments falling within the public records and business 
records exceptions will have no difficulty satisfying 
the reliability requirement. In one passage, the Court 
noted that "[r]eliability can be inferred without more 
in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception." /d. The public and busi-
ness records exceptions would seem to qualify as 
"firmly rooted." See 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 
1517-61b (business records),§§ 1630-38a (public 
records) (Chadbourn rev. 1974). In another passage 
discussing reliability, the Court stated that "certain 
hearsay exceptions rest on such solid foundations 
that admission of virtually any evidence within them 
comports with the 'substance of the constitutional 
protection.'" 448 U.S. at 66, quoting Mattox v. U.S., 
156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895). In an accompanying foot-
note, the Court cited the business and public records 
exceptions. /d. at 66 n.8. 
Although it may be argued that business and pub-
lic records generally bear adequate indicia of relia-
bility, laboratory reports may not. The Laboratory 
Proficiency Testing Program, sponsored by the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration, document-
ed a startlingly high incidence of errors in analyses 
performed by police laboratories. See J. Peterson, E. 
Fabricant & K. Field, Crime Laboratory Proficiency 
Testing Research Program (1978). 
Unavailability of the Declarant 
The unavailability requirement presents greater 
difficulties. While establishing the unavailability of 
the declarant is not a prerequisite for the admissibil-
ity of business and public records, Roberts "normal-
ly" requires a showing of unavailability. In Barber v. 
Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), the Court wrote: "[A] 
witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of the ... 
confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial 
5 
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain 
his presence at trial." /d. at 724-25. In Roberts,. the 
Court reaffirmed this test and added the following 
explanation: 
The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus, 
if no possibility of procuring the witness exists (as, for 
example, the witness' intervening death), "good faith" 
demands nothing of the prosecution. But if there is a 
possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative measures 
might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith 
may demand their effectuation. "The lengths to which 
the prosecution must go to produce a witness ... is a 
question of reasonableness." ... The ultimate question 
is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith 
efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present 
that witness. As with other evidentiary proponents, the 
prosecution bears the burden of establishing this predi-
cate. 448 U.S. at 74-75. 
Thus, in most cases a laboratory analyst would have 
to testify unless he is unavailable. See generally 
Note, Confrontation and the Unavailable Witness: 
Searching for a Standard, 18 Val. U.L. Rev. 193 (1983). 
In Roberts, however, the Court recognized an ex-
ception to the unavailability requirement. In a foot-
note, the Court stated that a "demonstration of una-
vailability, however, is not always required." 448 U.S. 
at 65 n.7. The Court cited Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 
(1970), as an example of a case in which the Court 
"found the utility of trial confrontation so remote 
that it did not require the prosecution to produce a 
seemingly available witness." 448 U.S. at 65 n.7. Jus-
tice Harlan, in his Dutton concurrence, cited the bus-
iness and public records exceptions, including a 
case admitting laboratory reports, Kay v. U.S., 255 
F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 358 U.S. 825 (1958), as 
examples of hearsay exceptions in which the produc-
tion of the declarant would be "of small utility to a 
defendant." 400 U.S. at 96. Justice Harlan's view, 
however, seems questionable. The Second Circuit in 
Oates outlined a number of areas that would be grist 
for cross-examination, such as whether the analyst 
was qualified, whether proper procedures were fol-
lowed, whether the procedures and analysis used 
were recognized in the profession as being reliable 
and, if instrumentation was employed, whether it 
was in good working order. 560 F.2d at 45 & 82. See 
also Phillips v. Neil, 452, F.2d 337,348 (6th Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972); Commonwealth v. 
McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 313, 322 A.2d 653, 655 (1974) 
(cross-examination important because experts often 
give conflicting opinions); Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (Investigative reports "are 
admissible only in civil cases and against the govern-
ment in criminal cases in view of the almost certain 
collision with confrontation rights which would re-
sult from their use against the accused in a criminal 
case."). 
In upholding the admissibility of laboratory reports 
in face of a constitutional challenge, a number of 
courts have cited the defendant's failure to sub-
poena the analyst. E.g., U.S. v. Miller, 23 C.M.A. 247, 
49 C.M.R. 380, 383 (1974); Burleson v. State, 585 
S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. Crim. 1979). For example, in 
State v. Spikes, 67 Ohio St. 2d 405,423 N.E.2d 1122 
(1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1'131 (1982), the 
court wrote that defense counsel "could have sub-
poenaed [the preparers] to testify at trial." /d. at 411, 
423 N.E.2d at 1128. There is no support for this view 
in Ohio v. Robwts; the Court never mentioned that 
the defendant's failure to take steps to secure the 
witness' attendance at trial was a significant factor. 
Moreover, although the Court mentioned the defen-
dant's right to call the declarant in Dutton v. Evans, 
400 U.S. 74,88 n.19 (1970), the Court's confrontation 
analysis did not rely on this factor. 
As one commentator has noted: 
The danger here is that the defendant will find himself in 
a dilemma: if he stands on the claim of error and refuses 
to invoke his right of compulsory process to produce the 
witness on his own initiative, the appellate court may 
conclude that he never had a genuine interest in an in-
person examination of the declarant; yet if the defen-
dant tries to mitigate the injury by proceeding to pro-
duce and examine the witness on his own, the appellate 
court may conclude that the prosecutor's error was 
harmless. This dilemma is obviously unacceptable, be-
cause it would preclude defendants from ever success-
fully challenging a prosecutor's failure to take the initia-
tive in producing a witness in person. Westen, Confron-
tation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evi-
dence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 623-24 
(1978). . 
6 
Thus, failure to call the analyst should not be con-
strued as a waiver of the right to confront him. See 
Phillips v. Neal, 452 F.2d 337, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972); Gregory v. State, 40 
Md. App. 297, 328 n.28, 391 A.2d 437; 455 n.28 (1978). 
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